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LABOR LAW - NORRIS-LAGUARDIA Am:- FEDERAL COURTS WrrHOUT 
JURISDICTION To ENJOIN STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF DEMAND THAT No JoBs BE 
ABOLISHED WrrHOUT RAILWAY UNION'S CONSENT- Respondent railroad 
sought authority from the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission 
to reduce the number of its station agents. Petitioner union not only 
contested but also demanded of the railroad that the following provision 
be added to the existing collective bargaining agreement: "No position in 
existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued except 
by agreement between the carrier and the organization."1 The commis-
sion thereafter found maintenance of the particular jobs to be wasteful and 
issued a mandatory order directing their abandonment.2 When the union 
prepared to strike in support of its demanded contract provision, the rail-
road sought an injunction in a federal district court. The district court's 
denial of injunctive relief was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit.a On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, 
reversed, three Justices dissenting, one Justice concurring specially.4 The 
union's demand presented a lawfully bargainable issue under the Railway 
Labor Act, and the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to deny jurisdiction to 
issue an injunction. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Chicago & No. W. Ry., 
362 U.S. 330 (1960). 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, when applicable, imposes strict substantive 
and procedural requirements and limitations on the granting of injunctive 
relief by federal courts, and on its face absolutely denies jurisdiction to en-
join strikes.is The act is applicable where a "labor dispute" exists, and the 
act's broad definition of a labor dispute,6 coupled with liberal constructions 
1 Principal case at !1!12. 
2 Principal case at !148; 69 S.D. PUBUC UTJLlTIES CoMM'N ANN. REP. 87 (1958). 
8 The court of appeals reversed the district court on the ground that the subject 
of the union demand was within the scope of managerial prerogative and therefore that 
the union could not force bargaining thereon. Chicago 8: No. W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. 
Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1959). 
4 Justices Clark, Whittaker and Frankfurter dissented. Mr. Justice Stewart concurred 
in the holding on the ground that there was no substantial federal question sufficient to 
give jurisdiction. He stated that if there was a federal question, he agreed with the dissent. 
r,47 Stat. 70 (19!12), 29 U.S.C. §§ 104(a), 107-110 (1958). For an example of the nature 
of these procedural limitations, 29 U.S.C. § 108 provides that no injunctive relief may be 
granted unless complainant has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by 
negotiation or with the aid of available government arbitration or mediation machinery. 
047 Stat. 7!1 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § Illl (1958). 
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of this definition by the Supreme Court,7 clearly indicate4 that the act 
applied in the principal case. The railroad attempted to avoid this apparent 
applicability by stretching a series of exceptions to the Norris Act so as 
to embrace the principal case. The exceptions had been created by the 
judiciary where rail union bargaining demands were found to be unlawful 
in that the demands exceeded the congressionally-granted bargaining powers 
of the union under the Railway Labor Act.8 This "unlawful demand" ex-
ception had been most broadly applied in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. 
Chicago River & Ind. R.R.,9 where a union struck in support of a demand 
involving the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. 
The Railway Labor Act permits either party to submit such disputes to 
binding arbitration;10 this the carrier had done. The Court enjoined the 
strike on the ground that the specific provisions of the Railway Labor Act 
should be enforced despite the general commands of Norris-LaGuardia. 
In the principal case the railroad sought to extend this exception, created 
for unlawfulness under a labor-regulating statute, to include unlawfulness 
under a non-labor statute. The railroad urged that the union demand was 
in two respects unlawful under the Interstate Commerce Act.11 First, the 
railroad characterized the union's demand as requiring the retention of 
jobs found to be wasteful12 by the South Dakota Commission, and alleged 
that this violated the National Transportation Policy set forth in the pre-
amble of the Interstate Commerce Act.13 Second, the railroad contended 
that the union demand violated that portion of the Interstate Commerce 
Act which impliedly left to the states the regulation of station service.14 It 
7 See, e.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938), where the 
Court applied Norris-LaGuardia to protect Negro picketing of a grocery store; the 
pickets hoped to encourage the hiring of Negroes. In reversing the lower court, Mr. Jus-
tice Roberts stated at 559, "We think the conclusion that the dispute was not a labor dis-
pute within the meaning of the Act, because it did not involve terms and conditions of 
employment in the sense of wages, hours, unionization or betterment of working conditions 
is erroneous." 
s In a series of cases where white or white-dominated rail unions contracted with em-
ployers to discriminate against Negro labor, the court enjoined the execution of the con-
tracts and held the Norris Act inapplicable. See, e.g., Graham v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949). 
9 353 U.S. 30 (1957). 
10 48 Stat. 1191 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (i) (m) (1958). 
1154 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-25 (1958). 
12 The expenses of operating several hundred one-man agencies on little-used branch 
lines exceeded revenues derived therefrom by $170,399 in 1956. The workload of the 
agents involved averaged 59 minutes per day. They were paid for a 40-hour week. Union 
work rules required that many of the agents not be on duty when the only train of the 
day passed their station. Principal case at 347, 348 nn.1 &: 3. 
13 The act's purpose is "to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient service 
and foster sound economic conditions in transportation and among the several carriers." 
54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1958) (preamble). 
14 Congress in 1958 made substantial revisions in the regulatory system for the na-
tion's railroads and gave the ICC jurisdiction over large areas which the states had pre-
viously regulated. However, after extensive consideration it deliberately left to the states 
the regulation of station services. H.R. REP. No. 1922, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1958). The 
intent of the Congress was to expedite the abandonment of unprofitable and unnecessary 
operations. S. REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 11 (1958). The Senate sub-com-
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argued that the union, by demanding that its permission be obtained for 
any abandonment of station services, was using its congressionally-established 
bargaining powers to usurp state authority in an area where Congress in-
tended the states to be supreme.15 
The majority, in an opinion written by Mr. Justice Black, found no 
conflict between the union's demand and the South Dakota Commission 
order. This mooted the railroad's argument that the union could not law-
fully usurp state authority, and made ineffectual the argument based on 
conflict with the Interstate Commerce Act's efficiency commands, for the 
only instances of inefficiency involved were those ordered to be abolished 
by the state agency. Instead, Mr. Justice Black found that the union merely 
wanted to discuss actions which might vitally and adversely affect the 
seniority, security, and stability of railroad jobs; that the union had not 
defied any state order; and that the union's demand was not prompted by 
the railroad's action in seeking state authority to put its agency consolida-
tion plan into effect.1 6 These findings can be squared with significant facts 
in the case only with the greatest difficulty.17 Mr. Justice Black must have 
reasoned that the union's demand, if granted, would not be per se a veto 
of the action of the South Dakota Commission, but rather would be only 
an unexercised contractual veto power. One can only speculate upon the 
mittee which conducted the hearings recommended that the railroads help themselves by 
applying more often to state agencies for authority to abandon uneconomic services. S. 
REP. No. 1647, 85th Cong., 1st &: 2d Sess. 21 (1958). On this point the union urged that 
the state commission had no implied authority from Congress, and that the commerce 
clause of the federal constitution preempted state power to interfere with the exercise 
of a federally-granted bargaining power. See note 20 infra. 
15 The dissent accepted essentially the position argued by the railroad. This position 
is an extension of the "unlawful demand" exception to Norris-LaGuardia to include 
demands unlawful under a non-labor statute. But cf. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. 
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U. S. 91 (1940), holding that union conduct violat-
ing the Sherman Act (a non-labor statute) did not warrant creating an exception to 
Norris-LaGuardia. 
16 Principal case at 340. 
17 At the South Dakota Commission hearings, the union contended that the exist-
ing collective bargaining agreement prevented abolishment of jobs without the union's 
consent. The union next demanded the inclusion in the collective bargaining contract 
of a clause expressly setting forth such an agreement. Principal case at 347. The union in 
a letter accompanying its strike ballot stated that the demanded agreement was necessary 
to prevent the effectuation of the railroad's plan for eliminating the agencies. The 
union's strike call stated that the need for the demanded agreement was demonstrated by 
the state commission's order to abolish the agencies. Principal case at 350 nn.9 &: 10. After 
the union made its demand, the railroad offered several methods of cushioning the 
effect of abolition of the jobs, among them the transfer of the agents involved to pro-
ductive jobs, the limiting of job abolishments to an agreed-upon number per year, and 
the payment of supplemental unemployment benefits to the agents affected. The union 
flatly refused to discuss any of these proposals. The railroad negotiator then indicated that 
the company's door would always be open for any discussion of the whole area. The 
union president testified that the only alternatives he gave the railroad were to agree 
to the demanded provision or to suffer a strike. Principal case at 349 n.6. Mr. Justice 
Black's conclusion that the union's purpose in striking was only to gain the right to dis-
cuss with management the railroad actions involved does not seem consistent with these 
facts. · 
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reasons why the Court avoided finding a conflict on these facts. In the 
principal case the existence of a conflict was obvious, but it is easy to 
visualize cases in which it would be difficult to determine whether a similar 
demand was to be used in conflict with a state order. Perhaps by refus-
ing to recognize a conflict until a union actually attempts to enforce an 
existing contract which is in conflict with a state order, the Court was 
seeking to avoid facing future cases with the necessity of determining a 
difficult factual question - whether a non-existent but demanded contract 
provision would or could be used in a manner inconsistent with state agency 
action. Furthermore, had the Court acknowledged a conflict and found the 
bargaining demand unlawful, it would have been faced with the alternative 
of creating a further judicial exception to the plain terms of Norris-La-
Guardia, or of holding that the federal courts were powerless to restrain a 
union from the unlawful use of its federally-granted bargaining powers.18 
By waiting to find conflict at a stage where the Court must decide whether 
to enforce a collective bargaining agreement, the Court will have avoided 
the specific Norris-LaGuardia prohibition of injunction of strikes. If the 
enjoining of the execution of the contracts is required, the Court then 
will need to create an exception only to the procedural requirements of 
Norris. This would be a less difficult course of action in view of several prec-
edents ignoring these requirements.19 
While the avoidance of these problems may have motivated the "no con-
flict" finding in the principal case, the finding will raise a number of other 
problems in the future. Collective bargaining in the industry may not be 
facilitated because the parties are given no indication of what their rights 
will be when the union attempts to enforce a contract which conflicts with 
a state order. Nevertheless, the holding does represent a considerable tact-
ical victory for the unions, for now a union can make it abundantly clear 
that it will strike in de facto opposition to a state order, and the railroad 
will not be entitled to judicial relief.20 In view of the fact that the rail 
unions today are shrinking in membership and desperately fear loss of 
18 If such a holding had been made, however, there would have presumably been no 
federal constitutional obstacle to the state courts' using their equity powers to enjoin 
strikes in order to effectuate state agency orders. Sec note 20 infra. 
19 The discrimination cases ignored the procedural requirement and enjoined the 
execution of contracts. See note 8 supra. The procedural requirements have likewise been 
ignored in enforcing contracts to arbitrate differences. Textile Worker's Union v. Lincoln 
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The same result was reached in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System 
Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), enforcing the duty to bargain. 
Further, in the context of enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement the Chicago 
River case may well apply to allow an injunction forcing arbitration, since the con-
troversy arguably will grow out of the interpretation or application of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 
20 Congressional legislation under the commerce clause of the federal constitution 
pre-empts state court authority to interfere with a rail union's lawful exercise of its 
bargaining powers under the Railway Labor Act. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 
(1957); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). 
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jobs,21 there ·will be few of their leaders who can afford not to go all the 
way in resisting state orders to abandon services. Add to this the fact that 
a prolonged strike today would toll the death knell of a number of the na-
tion's railroads,22 and it is apparent that the railroads will now experience 
even greater difficulties in abandoning uneconomic services. The finding 
also leaves state regulatory agencies uncertain as to their powers vis-a-vis 
union bargaining rights, and will therefore not improve the state regulation 
of railroads. Finally, the finding will prove troublesome in the context of 
Interstate Commerce Commission regulatory orders. The Commission has 
broad powers to determine the disposition of employees when authorizing 
mergers and abandonments of lines of track.23 If the rationale of the 
principal case is followed, a union dissatisfied with such a disposition of 
employees ·will be able to strike for an agreement that an authorized merger 
or abandonment not be made ,vithout its consent, and there ,vill be "no 
conflict" beaveen the union demand and the order.24 
Apart from a consideration of the "no conflict" finding, the decision also 
may have important implications ,vith regard to the scope of the subjects 
about which management is legally obligated to bargain under the National 
Labor Relations Act. Section 8 (d) of the NLRA defines the duty of unions 
and employers to bargain on "wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment."25 In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner 
Corp.,2 6 bargaining demands were categorized as "mandatory" or "per-
missive." A demand is mandatory only if its subject matter falls within the 
scope of section 8 (d). It was held that each party has an obligation to 
bargain in good faith on mandatory demands, but that a party who insists 
on agreement on a permissive demand, to the extent that negotiations on a 
mandatory subject reach an impasse, commits an unfair labor practice. 
Borrowing from these ideas, the court of appeals in the principal case 
theorized that demands falling outside the scope of section 2, First,27 of 
the Railway Labor Act were not mandatory subjects of bargaining, and 
21 Time, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 104. 
22 E.g., the plight of the New York, N.H. 8: H.R.R. was reported on June 27, 1960: 
Losses over the last three years have totaled $17.4 million and are expected to reach $23 
million by the end of 1960. According to its president, the railroad was then juggling 
every bit of available cash to stay in a currently solvent position, and the president expected 
insolvency within 12 months if help in the form of lower taxes and subsidies was not 
forthcoming. The statement was made in connection with an ICC investigation of the 
particular railroad's troubles. Wall Street Journal, June 27, 1960, p. I, col. 4. 
23 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5 (2) (f) (1958); ICC v. Railway Labor Executives 
Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942). 
24 Rail unions are now making strong efforts in the courts to block ICC-approved 
mergers until job security .is guaranteed. Time, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 104 . 
.25 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (d) (1958). 
26 356 U .s. 342 (1958). 
27 This section requires employers and unions to bargain on rates of pay, rules, and 
working conditions. 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1958). The duty is en-
forceable by order of a federal court. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, Ry. 
Employees, supra note 19. 
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therefore that a strike in support of such demand would be unlawful and 
could be enjoined.28 Since the Supreme Court did find the demand within 
the scope of section 2, First,29 and made no mention of the mandatory-
permissive concept, there is no basis for inferring that a Borg-Warner-type 
doctrine has been applied to the Railway Labor Act. However, in finding 
that the union's demand was within the scope of section 2, First, the Court 
at least made it certain that henceforth employers subject to the Railway 
Labor Act have a duty to bargain in good faith over demands that no jobs be 
abolished without union consent despite objections that such demands in-
vade what was considered to be a traditional area of exclusive managerial 
prerogative. In justifying this finding the Court emphasized that Congress 
requires the ICC to include in orders approving railroad consolidations con-
ditions which insure that for a certain term the consolidation will not 
worsen the position of the employees with respect to employment, and also 
that Congress authorizes the ICC to include conditions protecting employees 
in authorizations of abandonment.ao This emphasis suggests that employers 
subject to the NLRA will not have a duty to bargain over similar demands 
until there is comparable federal legislation to protect employees against 
displacement in this area. But the Court also emphasized that in the past 
unions and railroad employers had bargained over displacement benefits.al 
Thus it may be that a history of bargaining over displacement of workers 
will alone be enough to support a holding that an employer subject to the 
NLRA has a duty to bargain in good faith over a demand that no jobs be 
eliminated without union consent. 
David G. Hill 
2s Chicago &: No.W. Ry. v. Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 264 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1959). 
The court of appeals suggested both that a dispute over a permissive issue is per se not 
within the Norris-LaGuardia definition of a labor dispute, and that a strike in support 
of a demand on a permissive subject is unlawful and falls within the Chicago River excep• 
tion to Norris-LaGuardia. 
29 Principal case at 339. 
so Principal case at 337, 338. 
31Ibid. 
